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Summary
Background The isolation of symptomatic cases and tracing of contacts has been used as an early COVID-19 
containment measure in many countries, with additional physical distancing measures also introduced as outbreaks 
have grown. To maintain control of infection while also reducing disruption to populations, there is a need to 
understand what combination of measures—including novel digital tracing approaches and less intensive physical 
distancing—might be required to reduce transmission. We aimed to estimate the reduction in transmission under 
different control measures across settings and how many contacts would be quarantined per day in different strategies 
for a given level of symptomatic case incidence.
Methods For this mathematical modelling study, we used a model of individual-level transmission stratified by setting 
(household, work, school, or other) based on BBC Pandemic data from 40 162 UK participants. We simulated the 
effect of a range of different testing, isolation, tracing, and physical distancing scenarios. Under optimistic but 
plausible assumptions, we estimated reduction in the effective reproduction number and the number of contacts that 
would be newly quarantined each day under different strategies.
Findings We estimated that combined isolation and tracing strategies would reduce transmission more than mass 
testing or self-isolation alone: mean transmission reduction of 2% for mass random testing of 5% of the population 
each week, 29% for self-isolation alone of symptomatic cases within the household, 35% for self-isolation alone 
outside the household, 37% for self-isolation plus household quarantine, 64% for self-isolation and household 
quarantine with the addition of manual contact tracing of all contacts, 57% with the addition of manual tracing of 
acquaintances only, and 47% with the addition of app-based tracing only. If limits were placed on gatherings 
outside of home, school, or work, then manual contact tracing of acquaintances alone could have an effect on 
transmission reduction similar to that of detailed contact tracing. In a scenario where 1000 new symptomatic cases 
that met the definition to trigger contact tracing occurred per day, we estimated that, in most contact tracing 
strategies, 15 000–41 000 contacts would be newly quarantined each day.
Interpretation Consistent with previous modelling studies and country-specific COVID-19 responses to date, our 
analysis estimated that a high proportion of cases would need to self-isolate and a high proportion of their contacts to 
be successfully traced to ensure an effective reproduction number lower than 1 in the absence of other measures. If 
combined with moderate physical distancing measures, self-isolation and contact tracing would be more likely to 
achieve control of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 transmission.
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Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome corona virus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) spread rapidly across multiple countries 
in early 2020.1–3 A staple public health control measure 
for outbreaks of emerging, directly transmitted infections 
involves the isolation of symptomatic cases as well as the 
tracing, testing, and quarantine of their contacts.2 The 
effectiveness of this measure in containing new 
outbreaks depends on both the transmission dynamics 
of the infection and the proportion of trans mission that 
occurs from infections without symptoms.4 Evidence 
exists that SARS-CoV-2 has a reproduction number (R) of 
about 2–3 in the early stages of an outbreak,1,5 and many 
infections can occur without symptoms,6 which means 
isolation of symptomatic cases and contact tracing alone 
are unlikely to contain an outbreak unless a high 
proportion of cases are isolated and contacts successfully 
traced and quarantined.7
Several countries have used combinations of non-
pharmaceutical interventions to reduce SARS-CoV-2 
transmission.3,8 As well as isolating symptomatic indi-
viduals and tracing and quarantining their contacts, 
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measures have included general physical distancing, 
school closures, remote working, community testing, 
and cancellation of events and mass gatherings. It has 
also been suggested that the effectiveness of contact 
tracing could be enhanced through app-based digital 
tracing.9 The effectiveness of contact tracing and the 
extent of resources required to implement it successfully 
will depend on the social interactions within a popu-
lation.10 Targeted interventions such as contact tracing 
also need to consider individual-level variations in 
transmission: high variation can lead to superspreading 
events, which could result in larger numbers of contacts 
needing to be traced.11 Several examples exist of 
such events occurring for COVID-19, including meals, 
parties, and other gatherings involving close contacts.12
We used social-contact data from a large-scale UK 
study of over 40 000 participants13 to explore a range of 
different control measures for SARS-CoV-2, including 
self-isolation of symptomatic cases; household quaran-
tine; manual tracing of acquaintances (ie, contacts that 
have been met before); manual tracing of all contacts; 
app-based tracing; mass testing regardless of symptoms; 
limits on daily contacts made outside home, school, and 
work; and having a proportion of the adult population 
work from home. We estimated the reduction in 
transmission under different scenarios, and we estimated 
how many primary cases and contacts would be 
quarantined per day in different strategies for a given 
level of symptomatic case incidence.
Methods
Transmission model
For this mathematical modelling study, our analysis was 
based on data of 40 162 UK participants with recorded 
social contacts from the BBC Pandemic dataset.13 In the 
BBC Pandemic dataset, collected in 2017–18, a contact 
was defined as an interaction that either involved a face-
to-face conversation or physical contact, which broadly 
reflect the types of close contact that have been linked to 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters to date.12 Using these 
data, we simulated 25 000 individual-level transmission 
events by repeatedly generating contact distributions for 
a primary case and randomly generating infections 
among these contacts. In each simulation, we randomly 
specified a primary case as either younger than 18 years 
or aged 18 years and older, on the basis of UK demography, 
in which 21% of the population are younger than 
18 years.14 We then generated contacts by randomly 
sampling values from the marginal distributions of daily 
contacts made in three different settings for their age 
group (ie, younger than 18 years or adults): in household 
(defined as household size minus one), at work or school, 
and in other settings (figure 1A, B). We used the marginal 
distributions rather than raw participant data to ensure 
non-identifiability and reproducibility in our model code. 
Information was provided and consent obtained from 
all participants in the BBC Pandemic study before the 
app recorded any data. Our study was approved by 
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Observational Research Ethics Committee (ref 14400).
In our model, we assumed infected individuals had a 
certain probability of being symptomatic and of being 
tested if symptomatic, as well as an infectious period 
that depended on when or if they self-isolated after the 
onset of symptoms (table 1). We assumed a mean delay 
of 2·6 days from onset to isolation in our baseline 
scenario (appendix, p 2). We assumed individuals became 
infectious 1 day before onset of symptoms. During each 
day of the effective infectious period, individuals made a 
given number of contacts equal to their simulated daily 
contacts. To avoid double-counting household members, 
household contacts were not tallied over the entire 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed, BioRxiv, and MedRxiv for articles 
published in English from inception to April 15, 2020, with the 
following keywords: “2019-nCoV”, “novel coronavirus”, 
“COVID-19”, “SARS-CoV-2” AND “contact tracing” AND 
“model*”. Early modelling studies of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) suggested that isolation 
and tracing alone might not be sufficient to control outbreaks 
and additional measures might be required; these measures 
have since been explored in population-level models. However, 
an analysis with setting-specific social contact data to quantify 
the potential effect of combined contact tracing and physical 
distancing measures on reducing individual-level transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2 has not been done.
Added value of this study
We use data from more than 40 000 individuals to assess 
contact patterns and potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission in 
different settings and compare how combinations of 
self-isolation, contact tracing, and physical distancing could 
reduce secondary cases. We assessed a range of combined 
physical distancing and testing and tracing measures, including 
app-based tracing, remote working, limits on different sized 
gatherings, and mass population-based testing. We also 
estimated the number of contacts that would be quarantined 
under different strategies.
Implications of all the available evidence
Several characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 make effective isolation 
and contact tracing challenging, including high transmissibility, 
a relatively short serial interval, and transmission that can occur 
without symptoms. Combining isolation and contact tracing 
with physical distancing measures—particularly measures that 
reduce contacts in settings that would otherwise be difficult to 
trace—could therefore increase the likelihood of achieving 
sustained control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
See Online for appendix
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Figure 1: Model of social interactions and SARS-CoV-2 transmission and control
(A) Distribution of daily contacts made at home, work, school, and other settings in the BBC Pandemic dataset. (B) Examples of daily social contact patterns for 
four randomly selected individuals in the model. (C) Factors that influence whether an individual is isolated and whether contacts are successfully traced in the model 
(parameters presented in table 1). (D) Implementation of contact tracing in the model. The timeline shows a primary case with four daily contacts self-isolating 
either 1 or 3 days after onset of symptoms. We assumed the household contact to be the same person throughout, whereas other contacts are made independently. 
Had the primary case not been isolated, seven secondary cases would have occurred in this illustration (shown with circulations). For isolation 1 day after onset, 
four secondary infections were prevented immediately. Then seven contacts were potentially traceable, three of whom were infected. In this example, two infected 
contacts pre-isolation were successfully traced and quarantined (ie, one was missed), so overall the isolation-and-tracing control measure resulted in a 
4 + 2=6 reduction in the effective reproduction number. A similar illustration is shown for isolation 3 days after onset. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute 


























Individuals aged 18 years or olderIndividuals younger than 18 years
10 100 1000
Other contacts
Work or school contacts
Home contacts
Other contacts























1154 www.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 20   October 2020
infectious period, but instead were fixed. Once individual-
level contacts had been defined, we generated secondary 
infections at random on the basis of assumed secondary 
attack rates among contacts made in different settings, 
and we estimated how many contacts would be 
successfully traced in each of these settings under 
different scenarios (full description in the appendix, p 1). 
First, we generated the number of secondary cases without 
any control measures in place. Second, we randomly 
sampled the proportion of these secondary cases that were 
either successfully traced and quarantined, and hence 
removed from the potentially infectious pool, or averted 
through isolation of the primary case. The difference 
Assumed value Details and references
Individual-level dynamics
R in absence of control measures 2·6 SARs were chosen to be consistent with empirical estimates (table 2) and produce an R consistent with a 
meta-analysis of early studies;15 sensitivity analysis shown in the appendix (p 4)
Duration of infectiousness 5 days (for cases that 
will become 
symptomatic, first day is 
pre-symptomatic)
Given incubation period of about 5 days, this assumption implies serial interval of about 6·5 days16
Relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases 50% One published point estimate was 65%,17 but secondary cases from asymptomatic individuals were more likely to, in 
turn, be asymptomatic, suggesting lower contribution to transmission; sensitivity analysis shown in the 
appendix (p 3)
Proportion of cases who are eventually 
symptomatic
30% of children, 
70% of adults
Based on evidence synthesis of age-stratified COVID-19 data;18 sensitivity analysis shown in the appendix (p 3)
Probability that symptomatic individual will 
eventually self-isolate and be tested
90% We assumed that the virus is only detectable by PCR during the infectious period; 90% of UK survey respondents said 
they would likely comply with app request to self-isolate if rapid test available19
Effective duration of infectiousness if an 
individual self-isolates when symptomatic
Mean delay from onset 
to isolation of 2·6 days; 
distribution shown in 
the appendix (p 2)
We assumed that individuals are most likely to self-isolate 0–4 days after onset (ie, 1–5 days after becoming 
infectious); for 269 cases with known date of onset and confirmation in Singapore, of those who were confirmed 
within 5 days, 2% were confirmed on date of onset, 26% on day 2, 27% on day 3, 14% on day 4, and 31% on day 5;20 
we assumed that isolation could occur 1 day before confirmation; sensitivity analysis shown in the appendix (p 5)
SAR among contacts in home 20% Details in the SAR section of the Methods
SAR among other contacts 6% Details in the SAR section of the Methods
Contact tracing
Proportion of contacts who are acquaintances 
(ie, have been met before)
100% in household, 
90% at school, 79% 
at work, 52% in other 
settings
Data from BBC Pandemic dataset;13 for each contact reported, participants were asked “have you met this person 
before?”
Proportion of potentially traceable household 
contacts who are successfully traced
100% Assumed
Proportion of potentially traceable workplace, 
school, or other scenario contacts who are 
successfully traced
95% Assumed, with sensitivity analysis shown in figure 2
Probability that traced contacts adhere to 
quarantine
90% Proportion of traced contacts who are successfully removed from the potentially infectious group; we assumed 
virus is only detectable by PCR during the infectious period; 90% of UK survey respondents said they would likely 
comply with app request to self-isolate if rapid test available;19 we assumed contacts traced by app would be 
quarantined immediately and manually traced contacts would take 2 days to quarantine after isolation of the 
index case9,16
App-based tracing
Proportion of population that would have the 
app installed
53% We assumed that 71% of the population were smartphone users (details in appendix, p 1); 75% of UK survey 
respondents said they would probably or definitely download the app;19  therefore, we assume that 71% × 75%=53% 
of the population would have the app installed.
Mass testing
Proportion of the population that are tested 
per week
5% (ie, 460 000 tests 
per day for UK)
0·7% of the population tested per day, which is equal to the highest number of daily per person tests done anywhere 
in world as of mid-April, 2020 (details in appendix, p 1)
R=reproduction number. SAR=secondary attack rate.
Table 1: Parameter definitions and assumptions for the baseline model
Secondary attack rate 
among household 
contacts (%)
Secondary attack rate 







Shenzhen16 12·9% 0·9% 3·0 0·4
USA21 10·5% 0·0% 44·5 0·20
Guangzhou22 10·1% 0·5% 14·3 0·34
Taiwan23 6·6% 0·4% 27·6 0·21
Ningbo17 13·3% 5·1% 11·2 0·69
Guangzhou24 19·3% 5·3% 9·8 0·62
Table includes two separate analyses of contact tracing data from Guangzhou and differing estimates are likely to be 
influenced by control measures in place at the time.
Table 2: Secondary attack rates estimated from COVID-19 contact tracing studies by location
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between these two values gave the overall number of 
secondary cases that would contribute to further trans-
mission, the effective R (Reff; figure 1C, D).
Secondary attack rate data sources
To estimate the risk of transmission per contact in 
different community settings, we collated contact tracing 
studies for COVID-19 from multiple settings that strati-
fied contacts within and outside households (table 2). 
Across studies, the estimated secondary attack rate within 
households was 10–20%, with a much smaller secondary 
attack rate (ranging from 0% to 5%) estimated among 
close contacts made outside households. However, all 
these studies were done in a so-called under control 
scenario (ie, effective R<1) and some reported relatively 
few contacts (ie, fewer than ten per case), which might 
omit superspreading events, and isolation outside of 
house hold. These findings suggest that SARS-CoV-2 
infection might be driven by community transmission 
events as well as household contacts. In our main analysis, 
we assumed a secondary attack rate of 20% for households 
and 6% for all contacts, which led to an overall R of 2·6 in 
our model when no control measures were in place. This 
value is consistent with the estimated R values in the early 
stages of the epidemic.1,5
Scenarios
We considered several scenarios, both individually and in 
combination (appendix, p 2). These scenarios included 
no control, self-isolation of symptomatic cases within 
and away from household, household quarantine, 
quarantine of work or school contacts, manual tracing of 
acquaintances (ie, contacts that have been met before), 
manual tracing of all contacts, app-based tracing, mass 
testing of cases regardless of symptoms, a limit on daily 
contacts made in other settings (with the baseline limit 
being four contacts, equal to the mean number reported 
by adults in the BBC Pandemic data), and a proportion of 
the population with no school or work contacts. In the 
self-isolation only scenario, we assumed that individuals 
who were successfully isolated either had no risk of 
onward transmission (even to household members) or 
had no risk to contacts outside the household, but 
household members could still be infected. Otherwise, 
we assumed household quarantine was in place alongside 
other measures. For app-based tracing to be successfully 
implemented in a given simulation, both the infectious 
individual and their contacts needed to have and use the 
app. We assumed that individuals younger than 10 years 
or older than 80 years would not use a smartphone app 
(table 1). In the scenario with mass testing of cases 
regardless of symptoms, we assumed that infected 
individuals would be identified and immediately self-
isolate at a random point during or after their 5-day 
infectious period. We assumed that infected individuals 
would not test positive if they were tested during the 
latent period. No other measures (eg, self-isolation when 
symptomatic) were in place for this scenario. In the 
baseline scenario for reduced work contacts, we assumed 
that 50% of the population had no work contacts because 
Self-Isolation Contact tracing Non-HH contacts who are potentially 
traceable (%)
Cases who have 
R>1 (%)
Reff Mean reduction 
in Reff
No control No No NA 50% 2·6 0%
Self-isolation within home Yes No NA 40% 1·8 29%
Self-isolation outside home Yes NA NA 37% 1·7 35%
Self-isolation plus HHQ Yes HH NA 35% 1·6 37%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus work or school contact tracing Yes HH and work or 
school
100% 27% 1·2 53%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus manual contact tracing of 
acquaintances
Yes All 90% school, 79% work, and 52% other 26% 1·1 57%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus manual contact tracing of all 
contacts
Yes All 100% 21% 0·94 64%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus app-based tracing Yes All 53% 30% 1·4 47%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus manual contact tracing of 
acquaintances plus app-based tracing
Yes All 90% school, 79% work, and 52% other 
with manual tracing; 53% with app tracing
23% 1 61%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus manual contact tracing of 
acquaintances plus limit to four daily contacts with other 
individuals
Yes All 90% school, 79% work, and 52% other 21% 0·93 64%
Self-isolation plus HHQ plus manual contact tracing of 
acquaintances plus app-based tracing plus limit to 
four daily contacts with other individuals
Yes All 90% school, 79% work, and 52% other 
with manual tracing; 53% with app tracing
20% 0·87 66%
Mass testing of 5% of population per week No NA NA 49% 2·5 2%
Results from 20 000 simulated setting-specific secondary transmissions, assuming a secondary attack rate of 20% among household contacts and 6% among other contacts. Results under the assumption of 
some workplace restrictions remaining in place are shown in table 4. Estimates are shown to two significant figures. HH=household. HHQ=household quarantine. NA=not applicable. Reff=effective reproduction 
number.
Table 3: Mean reduction in Reff under different control measures
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54% of respondents in a UK social contact survey 
reported not visiting work in the days after lockdown was 
introduced on March 23, 2020.25 For each intervention 
scenario, we simulated 25 000 primary cases, generating 
individual-level contact distributions and secondary 
cases with and without the control measure in place, as 
previously described. The model code is available online.
Role of the funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding author 
had full access to all the data in the study and had 
final responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication.
Results
Under the control measures considered, we found that 
combined testing and tracing strategies reduced the Reff 
more than mass testing or self-isolation alone (table 3). If 
self-isolation of symptomatic cases alone was included, 
our optimistic scenario resulted in a mean transmission 
reduction of 29% if self-isolation was within the house-
hold and 35% if self-isolation was outside the household. 
The addition of household quarantine resulted in an 
overall mean reduction of 37%. In simulations, self-
isolation and household quarantine with the addition of 
manual contact tracing of all contacts reduced trans-
mission by 64%; the addition of manual tracing of 
acquaintances only led to a 57% reduction in transmission. 
We estimated that the addition of app-based tracing only, 
with our baseline assumption of 53% coverage, reduced 
transmission by 47%. Contact tracing measures also 
substantially reduced the probability that a primary 
symptomatic case would generate more than one 
secondary case (table 3).
We estimated that if some level of physical distancing 
were maintained, it could supplement reductions in 
transmission from contact tracing. For example, if daily 
contacts in other settings (ie, outside the home, work, 
and school) were limited to four people (the mean 
number in our dataset), manual tracing of acquaintances 
only led to a mean 64% reduction in transmission, and 
the addition of app-based tracing alongside this gave a 
mean 66% reduction overall. We estimated that mass 
random testing of 5% of the population each week would 
reduce transmission by only 2%, because substantially 
fewer infections would be detected than in other 
scenarios and many of those that were would have 
already transmitted infection.
We also considered the number of contacts that would 
be traced under different strategies. In a scenario 
where 20 000 new symptomatic cases occurred per day, 
most contact tracing strategies would require over 
500 000 contacts to be newly quarantined each day on 
average (table 4). We should note that if contact tracing 
is triggered on the basis of suspected COVID-19-like 
symptoms rather than confirmation of COVID-19, the 
number of symptomatic cases in these scenarios would 
reflect the total incidence of illness and not just of 
confirmed COVID-19 cases. Although we estimated a 
similar reduction in transmission from manual tracing 
of all contacts and from manual tracing of only 
acquaintances with a limit to four daily contacts in other 
Median number of 
people quarantined per 
detected case (90% 
prediction interval)
Mean newly quarantined 
people per day assuming 
20 000 new symptomatic 
cases per day
Mean newly quarantined 
people per day assuming 
5000 new symptomatic 
cases per day
Mean newly quarantined 
people per day assuming 
1000 new symptomatic 
cases per day
SI and HHQ 2 (0–4) 38 000 9400 1900
SI plus HHQ plus work or school CT 13 (1–110) 540 000 140 000 27 000
SI plus HHQ plus manual CT of 
acquaintances
22 (1–120) 650 000 160 000 32 000
SI plus HHQ plus manual CT of all 
contacts
29 (1–140) 830 000 210 000 41 000
SI plus HHQ plus app-based CT 4 (1–69) 310 000 76 000 15 000
SI plus HHQ plus manual CT of 
acquaintances plus app-based CT
25 (1–130) 740 000 180 000 37 000
SI plus HHQ plus manual CT of 
acquaintances plus limit to four daily 
contacts with other individuals
17 (1–110) 560 000 140 000 28 000
SI plus HHQ plus manual CT of 
acquaintances plus app-based CT plus 
limit to four daily contacts with other 
individuals
21 (1–110) 630 000 160 000 32 000
We assumed that quarantined contacts are independent. Estimates shown to two significant figures. If contact tracing is initiated on the basis of suspected rather than 
confirmed COVID-19 cases, the symptomatic case numbers here would reflect total incidence of COVID-19-like illness, which might be considerably higher than the number 
of confirmed cases. CT=contact tracing. HHQ=household quarantine. SI=self isolation.
Table 4: Number of additional people quarantined per symptomatic case under different scenarios for the absolute number of new symptomatic cases 
per day
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settings (table 3), manual tracing of acquaintances with a 
four-person limit required fewer people to be quarantined 
each day (table 4). We obtained similar results for the 
relative reductions in transmission and number of 
contacts traced when we assumed a higher secondary 
attack rate within household or among other contacts, 
which corresponded to baseline R values of 2·6–2·9 
(appendix, p 4).
We found that the effectiveness of manual contact-
tracing strategies was highly dependent on how many 
contacts were successfully traced, with a high level of 
tracing required to ensure Reff lower than 1 in our baseline 
scenario (figure 2A). If contact tracing was combined 
with a maximum limit to daily contacts made in other 
settings (eg, by restricting gatherings), we found that this 
limit would have to be small (ie, fewer than ten or 
20 contacts) before a discernible effect could be seen on 
Reff. The limit would have to be small (ie, fewer than 
about ten contacts) to ensure Reff lower than 1 for 
app-based tracing, even if half of adults also had no work 
contacts (figure 2B). When app-based tracing was in 
place, we estimated that if work contacts alone were 
restricted, a substantial proportion of the adult population 
would need to have zero work contacts to ensure Reff 
lower than 1 (figure 2C). Under our baseline assumptions, 
we estimated that app-based tracing would require a high 
Figure 2: Impact of contact tracing effectiveness and physical distancing on reduction in R (baseline R 2·6)
Reduction in R under different strategies for different proportions of work, school, and other contacts that are successfully traced (A); effect of the maximum limit on the number of daily contacts in 
other settings and control tracing strategies on R, either when adults are working as normal, or when 50% have no work contacts (B); effect of proportion of population with no work contacts (C); 
and effect of app-based tracing under different assumptions about app coverage (D). In all panels, other parameters are as presented in table 1. HQ=household quarantine. R=reproduction number. 
SI=self isolation.






Proportion successfully traced outside HH
R
SI + HQ + school or work tracing
SI + HQ + manual tracing (acquaintance only)
SI + HQ + manual (acquaintance, maximum four other contacts)
SI + HQ + manual tracing (all)
A
Maximum daily other contacts
1 10 100
SI + HQ + app−based tracing
SI + HQ + manual tracing (acquaintance only)
50% of adults with no work contacts
B






Proportion with no work contacts
R
SI + HQ + manual tracing (acquaintance only)
SI + HQ + manual tracing (all)
SI + HQ + app−based tracing
With school closure 
C
0·0 0·2 0·4 0·6 0·8 1·0
App coverage
SI + HQ + app−based tracing
With maximum four other contacts
D
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level of coverage to ensure Reff lower than 1 (figure 2D) 
because both primary case and contacts would need to 
install and use the app.
We also considered the effect of the proportion of 
infections assumed to be symptomatic and the relative 
contribution of asymptomatic individuals to trans-
mission. We estimated that if a high proportion of cases 
were symptomatic, self-isolation and contact tracing 
measures would lead to a greater relative reduction in 
transmission (appendix, p 3); this is mostly because 
more primary cases would be detected. Control measures 
were slightly less effective if the relative transmissibility 
of asymptomatic infections was higher (appendix, p 3) 
because it would mean more undetectable transmission 
occurring. However, because our baseline scenario 
assumed that 70% of adults were symptomatic, the 
overall effect of asymptomatic individuals on trans-
mission was less than it would be if most cases were 
asymptomatic. We estimated that if individuals self-
isolated rapidly (ie, with 1·2 days on average rather than 
2·6 days), self-isolation and household quarantine would 
lead to a larger reduction in transmission (appendix, p 5); 
correspondingly, if we assumed cases took longer to self-
isolate after becoming symptomatic (ie, 3·6 days on 
average), these measures were less effective. However, 
the estimated overall reduction from self-isolation and 
manual contact tracing was similar across the three 
scenarios because although more secondary infections 
occurred before isolation, a large proportion of them 
would be traced under our baseline model assumptions.
Discussion
Using a model of setting-specific interactions, we esti-
mated that strategies that combined isolation of sympto-
matic cases with tracing and quarantine of their contacts 
reduced the Reff more than mass testing or self-isolation 
alone. The effectiveness of these isolation and tracing 
strategies was further enhanced when combined with 
physical distancing measures, such as a reduction in work 
contacts, or a limit to the number of contacts made outside 
of home, school, or work settings. Not only does physical 
distancing reduce transmission, but it is also likely to 
reduce the number of unknown contacts who can be 
harder to trace. Several countries have achieved a 
prolonged suppression of SARS-CoV-2 transmission using 
a combination of case isolation, contact tracing, and 
physical distancing. In Hong Kong, isolation of cases and 
tracing of contacts was combined with other physical 
distancing measures, which resulted in an estimated Reff 
near 1 throughout February and March, 2020.26 In South 
Korea, testing and tracing has been combined with school 
closures and remote working.27
In our analysis, we estimated that many contacts would 
need to be traced and tested if the incidence of sympto-
matic cases was high. This logistical constraint might 
influence how and when it is possible to transition from 
ensuring an Reff lower than 1 through extensive physical 
distancing measures to reducing transmission 
predominantly through targeted isolation and tracing 
measures. Our estimate of many contacts potentially 
being traced per case in the manual tracing strategies we 
considered (table 4) suggests that any planning for 
ongoing control based on isolation and tracing should 
consider the probable need to do at least 30–50 additional 
tests for each symptomatic case reported. If contact tracing 
is initiated on the basis of suspected rather than confirmed 
SARS-CoV-2 infections, then the number of symptomatic 
cases that require follow-up tracing and testing might be 
considerably higher than the level of confirmed COVID-19 
incidence. Given the role of pre-symptomatic transmission 
for SARS-CoV-2, the quarantine of these contacts rather 
than symptom monitoring alone is likely to be more 
effective at reducing onward transmission.28
Our analysis has several limitations. We focused on 
individual-level transmission between a primary case 
and their contacts rather than considering higher degree 
network effects. Therefore, our results focused on 
possible reductions in transmission rather than temporal 
ranges of outbreak size or dynamics. Network structure 
might also influence specific interventions. If contacts 
were clustered (ie, know each other), the number 
of contacts that would need to be traced over multiple 
generations of trans mission could be reduced. Addi-
tionally, if an inverse relationship exists between the 
probability of detectable symptoms and app coverage, as 
might be the case for young children, it could reduce the 
effectiveness of symptom-based tracing for such index 
cases. We also assumed that contacts made within the 
home are the same people daily, but contacts outside 
home are made independently each day. Repeated 
contacts would also reduce the number of people that 
need to be traced. However, our estimates are consistent 
with the upper bound of numbers traced in empirical 
studies (table 2), as well as the analysis of UK social 
interactions that accounted for contacts of contacts.10 
Because our data were not stratified beyond the four 
contact settings we considered (home, work, school, and 
other), we could not consider additional specific settings, 
such as mass gatherings. However, our finding that 
gatherings in other settings needed to be restricted to 
small sizes before a noticeable effect on transmission 
occurred is consistent with findings that groups between 
ten and 50 people have a larger effect on SARS-CoV-2 
dynamics than groups of more than 50.29 In our main 
analysis, we used a limit of four daily contacts as an 
illustrative example. In reality, any control strategies 
would also need to consider the probable behaviour of a 
population in complying with social restrictions.
Our baseline assumptions were plausible but 
optimistic. Particularly, we assumed a delay of symptom 
onset to isolation of 2·6 days in the baseline scenario, 
and quarantine within 2 days for successfully manually 
traced contacts and immediately for app-based tracing, 
with 90% of contacts assumed to adhere to quarantine. 
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For context, on the basis of viral shedding dynamics, 
onset of infectiousness typically occurs 2–3 days after 
exposure.6 In our model, we considered self-isolation 
both within and outside the household, finding that 
isolation outside household led to slightly higher 
reduction in onward transmission than within; this 
reduction was not larger because some pre-symptomatic 
transmission had often already occurred. However, our 
conclusions about onwards transmission in the different 
control tracing scenarios were not dependent on 
assumptions about household transmission, because in 
these scenarios, we assumed that household quarantine 
would be in place too. We also simulated contact patterns 
at random for each individual in our population, whereas 
in an outbreak, a correlation between number of contacts 
and infection risk is likely to occur; individuals with 
multiple contacts might be more likely to acquire 
infection and transmit it to others. If this were the case, 
and we assume the same secondary attack rates, the 
overall reduction might be lower than we have estimated; 
however, to keep the baseline R consistent, this 
correlation would have to be offset by a lower secondary 
attack rate among contacts. We also did not include the 
potential for imported infections; when local infection 
prevalence is low, additional screening or restrictions 
might need to be considered to reduce the risk of new 
importations of cases.
Our results highlight the challenges involved in con-
trolling SARS-CoV-2. Consistent with previous modelling 
studies7,10 and observed early global outbreak dynamics, 
our analysis suggests that—depending on the overall 
effectiveness of testing, tracing, isolation, and quarant-
ine—a combination of self-isolation, contact tracing, and 
physical distancing might be required to maintain Reff 
lower than 1. Additionally, in a scenario where incidence 
is high, a considerable number of individuals might 
need to be quarantined to achieve control with use of 
strategies that involve contact tracing.
Contributors
AJK, PK, and WJE designed the analysis. AJK developed the model. 
AJK, PK, AJKC, SMK, MT, HF, and JRG contributed to collection, 
processing, and interpretation of the original BBC Pandemic dataset, 
as well as interpretation of the study findings. The CMMID COVID-19 
working group members contributed to interpretation of the study results. 
All authors contributed to writing the manuscript and approved the final 
version.
Declaration of interests
We declare no competing interests.
Acknowledgments
AJK was supported by a Sir Henry Dale Fellowship jointly funded by the 
Wellcome Trust and the Royal Society (grant 206250/Z/17/Z). MT was 
supported by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(grant EP/N509620/1). PK acknowledges support from the Royal Society 
(0RP\EA\180004). WJE was supported by the Medical Research Council 
(grant MC_PC_19065). We would like to thank Stephen Eglen for doing an 
independent CODECHECK on our model code.
References
1 Cereda D, Tirani M, Rovida F, et al. The early phase of the 
COVID-19 outbreak in Lombardy, Italy. ArXiv 2020; published online 
March 20. DOI:2003.09320 (preprint).
2 Ng Y, Li Z, Chua YX, et al. Evaluation of the effectiveness of 
surveillance and containment measures for the first 100 patients 
with COVID-19 in Singapore—January 2–February 29, 2020. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020; 69: 307–11.
3 Gudbjartsson DF, Helgason A, Jonsson H, et al. Spread of 
SARS-CoV-2 in the Icelandic population. N Engl J Med 2020; 
published online April 14; DOI:10.1056/NEJMoa2006100.
4 Fraser C, Riley S, Anderson RM, Ferguson NM. Factors that make 
an infectious disease outbreak controllable. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 
2004; 101: 6146–51.
5 Abbott S, Hellewell J, Thompson RN, et al. Estimating the time-
varying reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2 using national and 
subnational case counts. Wellcome Open Research. 2020. https://
wellcomeopenresearch.org/articles/5-112 (accessed April 14, 2020).
6 He X, Lau EHY, Wu P, et al. Temporal dynamics in viral shedding 
and transmissibility of COVID-19. Nat Med 2020; 26: 672–75.
7 Hellewell J, Abbott S, Gimma A, et al. Feasibility of controlling 
COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts. 
Lancet Glob Health 2020; 8: e488–96.
8 Hsiang S, Allen D, Annan-Phan S, et al. The effect of large-scale 
anti-contagion policies on the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. 
MedRxiv 2020; published online May 21. 
DOI:10.1101/2020.03.22.20040642 (preprint).
9 Ferretti L, Wymant C, Kendall M, et al. Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 
transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing. 
Science 2020; 368: eabb6936.
10 Keeling MJ, Hollingsworth TD, Read JM. The efficacy of contact 
tracing for the containment of the 2019 novel coronavirus 
(COVID-19). MedRxiv 2020; published online Feb 17. 
DOI:10.1101/2020.02.14.20023036 (preprint).
11 Endo A, CMMID COVID-19 Working Group, Abbott S, 
Kucharski AJ, Funk S. Estimating the overdispersion in COVID-19 
transmission using outbreak sizes outside China. Wellcome Open Res 
2020; 5: 67.
12 Leclerc Q J, Fuller NM, Knight LE, CMMID COVID-19 Working 
Group, Funk S, Knight GM. What settings have been linked to 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters? Wellcome Open Res 2020; 5: 83.
13 Klepac P, Kucharski AJ, Conlan AJ, et al. Contacts in context: 
large-scale setting-specific social mixing matrices from the BBC 
Pandemic project. MedRxiv 2020; published online March 5. 
DOI:10.1101/2020.02.16.20023754 (preprint).
14 Office for National Statistics. 2011 UK census. Colchester: UK Data 
Service, 2011.
15 Davies NG, Kucharski AJ, Eggo RM, Gimma A, CMMID COVID-19 
Working Group, Edmunds WJ. The effect of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions on COVID-19 cases, deaths and demand for hospital 
services in the UK: a modelling study. MedRxiv 2020; published 
online April 6. DOI:10.1101/2020.04.01.20049908 (preprint).
16 Bi Q, Wu Y, Mei S, et al. Epidemiology and transmission of 
COVID-19 in 391 cases and 1286 of their close contacts in Shenzhen, 
China: a retrospective cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis 2020; published 
online April 27. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30287-5.
17 Chen Y, Wang A, Yi B, et al. The epidemiological characteristics of 
infection in close contacts of COVID-19 in Ningbo city. 
Chin J Epidemiol 2020; published online March 4. 
DOI:10.3760/cma.j.cn112338-20200304-00251 (in Chinese).
18 Davies NG, Klepac P, Liu Y, et al. Age-dependent effects in the 
transmission and control of COVID-19 epidemics. MedRxiv 2020; 
published online May 3. DOI:10.1101/2020.03.24.20043018 
(preprint).
19 Abeler J, Altmann S, Milsom L, Toussaert S, Zillessen H. Support 
for app-based contact tracing of COVID-19. OSFPreprint 2020; 
published online April 14. DOI:osf.io/3k57r (preprint).
20 nCoV-2019 Data Working Group. Epidemiological data from the 
nCoV-2019 outbreak: early descriptions from publicly available data. 
2020. https://github.com/beoutbreakprepared/nCoV2019 (accessed 
April 14, 2020).
21 Burke RM, Midgley CM, Dratch A, et al. Active monitoring of persons 
exposed to patients with confirmed COVID-19—United States, 
January–February 2020. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020; 
69: 245–46.
22 Luo L, Liu D, Liao X, et al. Modes of contact and risk of transmission 
in COVID-19 among close contacts. MedRxiv 2020; published online 
March 26. DOI:10.1101/2020.03.24.20042606 (preprint).
Articles
1160 www.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 20   October 2020
23 Cheng H-Y, Jian S-W, Liu D-P, et al. Contact tracing assessment of 
COVID-19 transmission dynamics in Taiwan and risk at different 
exposure periods before and after symptom onset. JAMA Intern Med 
2020; published online May 1. DOI:10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.2020.
24 Jing Q-L, Liu M-J, Yuan J, et al. Household secondary attack rate of 
COVID-19 and associated determinants. MedRxiv 2020; published 
online April 15. DOI:10.1101/2020.04.11.20056010 (preprint).
25 Jarvis CI, Van Zandvoort K, Gimma A, et al. Quantifying the impact 
of physical distance measures on the transmission of COVID-19 in 
the UK. BMC Med 2020; 18: 124.
26 Cowling BJ, Ali ST, Ng TWY, et al. Impact assessment of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions against coronavirus disease 2019 
and influenza in Hong Kong: an observational study. 
Lancet Public Health 2020; 5: e279–88.
27 Government of the Republic of Korea. Flattening the curve on 
COVID-19: how Korea responded to a pandemic using ICT. 
Seoul: Government of Korea, 2020.
28 Peak CM, Kahn R, Grad YH, et al. Individual quarantine versus active 
monitoring of contacts for the mitigation of COVID-19: a modelling 
study. Lancet Infect Dis 2020; published online May 20. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30361-3.
29 Brooks-Pollock E, Read JM, House T, Medley G, Keeling MJ, 
Danon L. The population attributable fraction (PAF) of cases due to 
gatherings and groups with relevance to COVID-19 mitigation 
strategies. MedRxiv 2020; published online March 23. 
DOI:10.1101/2020.03.20.20039537 (preprint).
